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THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND
CORRECTIONS: A GLIMPSE
Fred Cohen* & Joel A. Dvoskin*
L Introduction
To our knowledge, therapeutic jurisprudence has not yet had
a long visit with the world of jails and prisons. The authors, on the
other hand, do regularly visit those institutions in various roles: as
professor, as researcher and writer, as clinician, as administrator, and
as consultant.
We are novices at therapeutic jurisprudence but have
extensive experience in the world of law, corrections, and mental
health. In this our first effort at trying therapeutic jurisprudence on
for size, we first set out our broad understanding of therapeutic
jurisprudence, along with a well-intentioned critique and a strong
suggestion that at least one important research dimension seems
lacking.
Thereafter, we describe some of the characteristics of
corrections as they seem to impact on therapeutic jurisprudence
analysis. For example, captives-our term for jail detainees and
prison inmates-often seek judicial assistance in their expansion of
their diminished liberty.' Therapeutic jurisprudence, on the other
hand, speculates about an undue emphasis on deprivations of liberty
associated with civil commitment of persons with mental illness.2
Finally, we attempt to put therapeutic jurisprudence into play
within the area of custodial suicide, one of the many possible areas
© Copyright 1993 by the New York Law School Journal of Human Rights.
Professor of Law & Criminal Justice, State University of New York at Albany.
Associate Commissioner for Forensic Services, New York State Office of Mental
Health. The authors wish to thank Editor in Chief Leonardo A. D'Alessandro and his
associates for their considerable help in transforming a talk into a publishable article.
E.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
2 See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 3, 5 (David B. Wexler &
Bruce J. Winick eds., 1991).
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within corrections. At a minimum, we find that the therapeutic
jurisprudence perspective keeps our feet to the fire; it insists that we
look to consequences and not the elegance of a legal syllogism or the
design of a study. Whether this is new, and whether this matters, is
another story.
IL Therapeutic Jurisprudence Examined
We have been invigorated-and occasionally baffled-by our
forays into the growing body of literature on therapeutic
jurisprudence. One of us (FC) confesses to having been one of those
"sixties" academic lawyers who observed civil commitments of the
mentally ill, who interviewed judges, lawyers, and psychiatrists, and
who walked through a few back wards of mental hospitals, even
visiting the Alabama institutions involved in the landmark case of
Wyatt v. Stickney.3 The other (JD) has spent a career working in the
public sector, as a psychologist and administrator within public
institutions and agencies, and has frequently participated in class
action litigation, often on the side of the government.
David Wexler is, of course, correct in pointing to the
transcendence of liberty as a "sixties" value and the reflexive pursuit
of procedural parallelism as both an analytical tool-the lawyer's
penchant for reasoning by analogy-and as a basis for designing
change.4 However, an emphasis on personal autonomy and liberty,
along with procedural hurdles and substantive rules of restraint, have
over the years appeared remained worthy objective for both of us.
In our youth, what we saw and read convinced us that
keeping as many people as possible out of the "mega-institutions" of
the sixties was an eminently worthwhile objective. In a prior article,
one of us pointed out the rolelessness, the futility of the lawyer's trial
function and urged, inter alia, the development of a pre-hearing
1 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (finding inadequate treatment programs
violative of patients' constitutional rights), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Wyatt
v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
1 Wexler, supra note 2, at 5-7.
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attorney role.' That is, the article argued for the development and
exploration of pre-hearing alternatives primarily aimed at securing
treatment in the community when needed and the avoidance of civil
commitment." It posed parallels in the way some attorneys could
"negotiate" juveniles and some adult offenders out of the
incarcerating system and into something in the community that might
be meaningful.7 The article again betrayed a reflexive preference for
liberty and autonomy over confinement' and even suggests an early
admiration for Thomas Szasz.9
One further piece of nostalgia: Early on, we were convinced
that procedural reformers often asked the wrong questions, indeed,
posed answers in the form of questions. For example, arguing for a
right to counsel in civil commitment was an easy analogical and
precedential argument to make.° With Gideon v. Wainwright" and
In re Gault2 decided, and with the Court at least flirting with a
functional versus formalistic analysis, 3 it was not difficult to focus
on loss of liberty-as opposed to the formalism of criminal versus
civil law-as the premise for procedural due process.
On the other hand, with civil commitment not formally within
the strictures of the Sixth Amendment mandate that "[iun all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence, 1 4 it seemed that concentrating only on a right to
I Fred Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44 TEX. L. REV. 424, 425 (1966).
6 Id. at 452-53, 455.
I d. at 455-56.
I1d. at 433.
9 Id. at 436.
'o See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 34-35 (1967).
t Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (holding indigent defendant
in criminal state prosecution has the right to appointment of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment).
12 Gault, 387 U.S. at 41, 54-57 (holding that juveniles have a right to notice of
charges, to counsel, to confrontation, to cross-examination, and to privilege against self-
incrimination).
13 See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (stating that the
Constitution is concerned with practical consequences and not formal categorizations of
state law).
"4 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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counsel analogue might not be the best strategy. That is, should we
or should we not first flesh out the actual representational needs of
the prospective patient-including the pre-hearing, hearing and post-
hearing stages-and then search for an answer? That answer might
have been counsel in a traditional sense, but with the development of
new professional obligations or the invention of perhaps an entirely
new sort of advocate. Thus, in the process of asking about
needs-and what helps or doesn't-we' have been flirting with
therapeutic jurisprudence before it was named. The rarely articulated
premise of the "due process" reformers of the sixties was that
government-certainly in its liberty depriving functions-was the
enemy. Government was to be feared most when it sought to help.
If government was the enemy, and no matter how benevolent the
liberty-depriving process claimed to be, then legal business had to be
conducted at arms length. In contrast, a family model may be posed
as the opposite of a government-as-enemy model, with some clear
differences emerging. A family model posits shared values, common
goals, informality, respect for the authority of the sovereign, and, if
not a willingness to comply with rulings, at least a tacit agreement to
do so.
David Wexler sees common ground between therapeutic
jurisprudence and Professor Edward Rubin's "New Public Law". 5
To the extent that this new scholarship is aimed at legislators and
administrators who, when given reasoned policy alternatives, will act
in the public interest, it rests on a premise of shared values and
common goals that we are not certain always exists. Indeed, in our
experience with correctional agencies, we find that litigation and its
threat of personal and financial costs to government agencies and
officials are often the most important influences in achieving change.
We endorse the need to pursue scholarship beyond doctrinal
analysis and the relentless pursuit of logical symmetry and we accept
as valid the mandate of therapeutic jurisprudence to move from
doctrinally grounded exegesis to empirically grounded speculation. 16
For us, a review of the therapeutic jurisprudence literature to date is
IS David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conception of Legal
Scholarship, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCL & L. 17, 17-19 (1993). See Edward L. Rubin, The
Concept of Law and the New Public Law Scholarship, 89 MICH. L. REV. 792 (1991).
16 Wexler, supra note 15, at 20-21, 29.
1993] CORRECTIONS: A GLIMPSE 781
troubling. Therapeutic jurisprudence, as we understand it, expects
legal scholars to use empirical data, not necessarily to generate it. It
asks an astounding number of "what if" questions; such questions
arise from speculation generated by a study of the available data.17
It seeks to stimulate self-evaluation in terms of the workability of
proposals, not simply acceptance by fellow scholars.1"
In addition to our problems with the apparent willingness of
some therapeutic jurisprudence scholars to accept the notion of a
rational and perhaps even a concerned legislature and of legislative
and administrative good will and responsiveness to reason,19 there is
an important "on the ground" dimension that seems to be missing in
the therapeutic jurisprudence literature. Relying on the formal
description of a process or on analytical speculation often creates
what Malcolm Feeley refers to as the "fallacy of formalism. "20 If
therapeutic jurisprudence scholars are indeed interested in change-as
opposed to multi-dimensional speculation about change-then it is not
enough to simply enlarge the law library collection. Out of the stacks
you must go; you must walk the halls and talk with the "folks." The
future of therapeutic jurisprudence, then, is not entirely in
speculation, but also in investigation.
Reduced to its basics, therapeutic jurisprudence seeks to
expand the scope of the marriage of law and the behavioral
sciences,21 to move from the study of law itself to the practical study
of the therapeutic or counter-therapeutic consequences of the law.22
It asserts that the "rights" approach to improvements in the quality of
"7 See, e.g., David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence as a
New Approach to Mental Health Law Policy Analysis and Research, 45 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 979, 990-91, 993-94 (1991) (stating that therapeutic jurisprudence asks various
questions such as the proper rationale for and therapeutic consequences of a patient's
right to refuse treatment and treatment of incompetent death row inmates).
11 Wexler, supra note 15, at 19.
'9 See id. at 18-19.
2o MALCOLM M. FEELEY, COURT REFORM ON TRIAL: WHY SIMPLE SOLUTIONS
FAIL, 194-95 (1983).
21 Wexler, supra note 15, at 19, 29; Wexler & Winick, supra note 17, at 1004.
' David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in ESSAYS, supra
note 2, at 17, 30-31.
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psychological life is dead, replaced by a more pragmatic focus on
"results. 
"23
Perhaps therapeutic jurisprudence is to "rights" what early
twentieth century sociological jurisprudence was to legal positivism.
In his 1922 Storrs Lectures at Yale Law School, Roscoe Pound traced
the evolution of the philosophy of law and found that "[a]ttention was
turned from the nature of law to its purpose, and a functional
attitude, a tendency to measure legal rules and doctrines and
institutions by the extent to which law they further or achieve the
ends for which the law exists . . . ..
IlI. Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Relevant Characteristics
of Corrections
With the foregoing as prologue, we turn now to our assigned
task, one that asks us to ruminate on issues of therapeutic
jurisprudence in the world of corrections. In order to do this, we
must first turn to a brief examination of what rightly may be deemed
therapeutic within the context of corrections. This consideration
highlights one of the difficulties with therapeutic jurisprudence: the
need to specify just what is therapeutic, who decides, with what
authority, and by what means. In all candor, here we decide by
speculation and with the very limited authority granted authors.
One might assert several different sets of "therapeutic"
objectives within the liberty depriving world of corrections. For
example, the stated "therapeutic" interests of many inmates might
well begin and end with freedom: "Let me go and your therapy be
damned." One might look at the issue from the narrow view of
simply managing the institutions. From this perspective, the long
term reduction of criminal recidivism seems irrelevant. All that
matters is maintaining control and allowing the staff to finish their
shifts in good health. Inmates' achievement of literacy, for example,
would be desirable only insofar as the classroom keeps them out of
23 Id. at 29.
24 ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 91 (5th ed.
1937).
[Vol. X
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trouble during the day. Medical care would be exclusively palliative
in nature, and pain killers would rule the formulary.
To the outside world, of course, such a view of prison either
is or should be unacceptable, if for no other reason than that the vast
majority of prisoners will soon be released. To the "free world," the
therapeutic interests of corrections are likely to be quite different than
to inmates or their managers. An informed community would most
value a prison system whose parolees are least likely to reoffend and
from which no inmates escape to terrorize surrounding towns.
Certain communities have other interests as well. The
importance of correctional facilities in the American economy cannot
be overstated. The recent explosion in prison census has created
thousands of jobs,25 in some cases actually saving towns from
economic collapse.26 In those communities that are not directly
affected by the economic benefits of prison expansion there may exist
exactly the opposite "therapeutic" interest; for them, the growth in
prisons has meant higher taxes and budget deficits, with no reduction
in crime and no end in sight. Our point here is that self-interest-
whether or not ultimately endorsed as therapeutic-consistently leads
to competition over divergent ends. The invention and enforcement
of constitutional norms have served as leveling devices in corrections.
These norms often mediate between competing self-interests and do
so without an explicit regard for therapeutic outcomes.
At the risk of appearing cynical, we might suggest that left to
the self-interests of government and its constituencies-that is, absent
constitutionally derived substantive and procedural rights-mental
health services in prisons likely would be reduced to that necessary
to manage prisons quietly and perhaps safely, at least for the staff.
Certainly, the longer, wiser view would suggest otherwise; well-
programmed prisons may yet succeed in reducing recidivism and
25 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1992 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 198 (112th ed. 1992) (prison population increased
from 329,821 in 1980 to 774,375 in 1990.).
2 See Sue McMillin, It Doesn't Have Growth Locked Up, CHI. TRIB., June 14,
1992, at 1E.
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ultimately creating safer communities.27 But when has the American
public taken the longer view?
We believe that constitutionally grounded procedural and
substantive rights have enduring value in American correctional
institutions. By clearly establishing the level below which services
may not descend, the courts lead us to where our various and
collective senses of what is therapeutic may not. Values such as
providing medical and mental health care for those captives who are
in pain, notice and a hearing for those who are accused, access to the
courts, freedom from gratuitous punishment are so basic as to exist
outside the debate on therapeutic value.2" On the other hand, the
modality, duration, and location of medical and mental health care
are issues that may well benefit from therapeutic jurisprudence
analysis.
Elsewhere, we have posited three objectives, located within
the constitutional mandate, that government must provide in order to
meet the mental health care needs of captives:
1. to reduce the disabling effects of serious mental
illness in order to maximize each inmate's ability to
participate in rehabilitative programs within the prison
if he or she so chooses;
2. to reduce the needless extremes of human suffering
caused by mental illness; [and]
3. to help keep the prison safer for staff, inmates,
volunteers, and visitors.29
For those inclined to therapeutic jurisprudence who also
accept our view that one must leave the library, you must talk with
the captives and the captors in the enclosed world of jails and
prisons. You must talk most with the captors in closest contact with
27 See Paul Gendreau & Robert R. Ross, Revivification of Rehabilitation: Evidence
From the 1980s, 4 JUST. Q. 349, 350-51 (1987) (rehabilitating offenders reduces
recidivism).
s See Connie Mayer, Survey of Case Law Establishing Constitutional Minima for the
Provision of Mental Health Services to Psychiatrically Involved Inmates, 15 NEw ENO.
J. ON CIuM. & Civ. CONF IMENT 243, 244-45 (1989).
" Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates With Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and
Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 462, 462 (1992).
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the captives. You must do this to enrich your grasp of the issues and
to obtain a sense of who wants what and how to deal with those
wants. The nice syllogisms of law and the rapid fire "what ifs" of
therapeutic jurisprudence will be importantly affected by this
experience.
In the world of prisons and jails, we argue that no matter how
elegant and seemingly complete a plan for change, no matter how
reasoned the law upon which it rests, to the extent deputy sheriffs,
correctional officers, nurses, and sergeants are not committed to the
plan, it can be easily subverted. We have come to believe that using
the law-for example on medical or psychiatric care, or suicide
prevention-as a club within a preventive law model and involving
line staff both in the definition of the problem and in the formulation
of a plan for change, one can bring about workable, even therapeutic,
results.
We have both been retained by a number of states as litigation
strategists, consultants, or expert witnesses, often to assess the
constitutionality of their prison mental health systems and, in some
cases, to then devise plans to remedy that which requires fixing.
Obviously, constitutional minima are not always the equivalent of
good public policy; nevertheless, in achieving change, it is a good
place to start. Working with government after the government is
faced with a law suit allows one to borrow the energy generated by
someone else's legal club, a club which may then be used
derivatively as a positive way to achieve change.
A consultant may say to prison officials (indeed, each of us
has): "You must never again use that cell as a mental health
observation cell; you must never use this room for reception and
classification-it is degrading, inhuman and impairs the process. I
also think it is unconstitutional." Not infrequently, the rooms are
shut and a clear therapeutic result is achieved.
Why do prison officials, with long experience and training in
their profession, make these significant changes in policy on the word
of a consultant? Not infrequently, these same suggested changes had
been recommended by their own mental health staff members for
years but with no action. Is it because the consultant is a more
credible source of appropriate information? Since one of us is an
attorney with no clinical credentials and the other a clinician with no
legal credentials, such a view is unlikely. Rather, it is the
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consultant's derived credibility vis a vis the courts that causes action.
The effective consultant in such cases knows the applicable
law, but more importantly has seen the law in action in other states
and counties. This knowledge of the law and practice is placed to
work for the client. After an overall assessment of the system, the
next task is to identify legally relevant issues, and work with in-house
staff to design practical solutions. Only then will the effective
consultant set about the task of accomplishing change. In the context
of ongoing or impending litigation, and the threat of faring poorly,
the consultant uses persuasion, and perhaps even threats, to convince
the agency to change.3 °
While the threat of litigation may be useful in motivating
government officials toward "therapeutic" ends, the litigation itself is
quite another matter. For a variety of reasons, for captors and
captives alike, the process of federal class action litigation can be
painful and destructive, even if it eventually brings about positive
change. The process itself may accurately be termed antitherapeutic.
Foremost among the negative effects of litigation is the
expenditure of potentially vast sums of money.3" In large class
actions, litigation costs alone, independent of any substantive
expenses pursuant to settlement or adverse decisions, can reach into
the millions of dollars.32 These expenses include the review of tens
of thousands of pages of documents, tours, meetings, depositions of
expert witnesses, legal fees of plaintiffs who ultimately prevail, and
hours upon hours of overtime expense to prepare documents.33 Many
prisons assign staff members full-time as litigation coordinators for
years in order to coordinate one suit. The sums of money spent
exclusively on the process of litigation could be otherwise aimed at
improving the conditions which occasioned the lawsuit in the first
place.
Equally negative are the effects on staff morale. The specter
of constant, pervasive, seemingly malevolent scrutiny affects staff at
30 Id. at 467.
"' Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical Limitations on Creative Financing of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 539, 547 (1988).
32 Id. at 570.
3 Robert G. Doumar, Prisoners' Civil Rights: A Pompous Delusion, 11 GEO.
MASON U. L. REv. 1, 19-22 (1988).
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all levels of the organizational chart. Trust between inmates and
staff, which may have already been thin, may erode even further as
staff begin to assume that every complaint is raised with the inmate's
eye on a "payday" in court. Finally, staff anger and fear can
unfortunately result in incidents of violence.34
It may seem contradictory to defend the continued need for
judicially defined and enforced constitutional minima of substantive
and procedural rights while at the same time warning of the negative
effects of the litigation process. The answers to this dilemma require
action by all three players in the drama: government officials,
plaintiffs (and their counsel), and the courts themselves.
For those who run prisons, the best way to avoid litigation is
to reduce the chances that it will succeed by building service systems
that clearly exceed constitutional minima. In the case of mental
health services, we have elsewhere argued for a cost effective system
of services which clearly exceed any reported constitutional
requirements." In order to accomplish this, it is first necessary to
know clearly what those minima are, whether by the ongoing
education of staff in applicable legal mandates or by bringing in
consultant experts.36 This knowledge must then be used to educate
the appropriate officials on the logic which supports service
enhancements as insurance against litigation.
For plaintiffs and their attorneys, it is useful to focus on the
long-range goal of systems change, recognizing that voluntary and
collaborative changes will be accomplished with greater enthusiasm
and ultimately will last longer than compulsory changes achieved
through prolonged litigation.
For the courts, one of the most important roles may actually
be the simplest: correctional officials and inmates alike have a need
for, and a right to, clarity about the rules of engagement.37 Asked to
I See Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 29, at 463 (stating that the absence of mental
health services leads to increased staff stress and increases the likelihood of violence
between the staff and untreated inmates).
" See id. at 463-64.
See generally FRED COHEN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUsTICE, LEGAL ISSUES AND THE MENTAL DISORDER (1988) (discussing various
issues involved with the incarceration of the mentally disordered).
37 See Walter J. Dickey, The Promise and Problems of Rulemaking in Corrections:
The Wisconsin Experience, 1983 Wis. L. REV. 285 (1983).
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hit a moving target, many officials will simply refuse to improve
anything until the standards of care are clear and stable. Thus, if
standards are unclear or in constant flux, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for correctional officials to gain access to the resources
necessary to meet them. Inmates may also be negatively affected,
since they will not know what to expect from their captors if every
apparent gain is met with arguments for even higher standards. In
other words, if government officials may be caricatured as generally
providing too little, plaintiffs may be equally caricatured as asking for
too much too often.
To the extent that therapeutic jurisprudence scholars are
interested in generating questions and concerned more with impact
than legal symmetry, they clearly have a place in the world of
corrections. With perhaps a million people in prison and jails,38 two
and a half million under correctional supervision 39--about one percent
of the nation's adult population-and with a large number of this total
group believed to be substance abusers,4 ° sex offenders,41 or mentally
ill, 42 there is a strong case for seeking therapeutic ends or at least
avoiding the anti-therapeutic consequences of correctional
interventions.
Whether alcoholism, drug addiction, or a proclivity to commit
sex offenses should be "medicalized" and then shoehorned into the
Eighth Amendment right to medical/psychiatric care for serious
s As of Dec. 31, 1991, there were 789,347 people in prison and as of June 30, 1988
there were 343,569 people in jail. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, 1992 SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 596, 608 (1993). See
Janny Scott, Finding the Right Road to a Drug Free America, LOS ANOELES TIMES, Feb.
14, 1993, at M3; Howard Goodman, A Crushing Load for Corrections Officers Cases
Are Doubling, Sometimes Tripling, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Apr. 20, 1992, at Al.
39 As of Dec. 31, 1990, there were 2,670,234 people on probation in the United
States. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 567.
1 In 1989, 58.1% of jail inmates had used drugs on a regular basis. Id. at 602. In
1991, 62.2% of all state prison inmates had used drugs on a regular basis. Id. at 626.
4 In 1991, 9.4% of state prison inmates had committed rape or other sexual assault.
Id. at 623.
42 Ralph Slovenko, The Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Revisited, 24 PAC. L.J.
1107, 1119 n.72 (1993) (estimating that more than 7 percent of national jail population
is seriously mentally ill).
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disorders is an issue beyond the purview of this paper. 43 However,
to the extent that correction programs expand to treat appropriate
disabilities such as substance abuse," then to that extent the playing
field for therapeutic jurisprudence would have expanded.
Let us describe some of the broad features of corrections that
should be part of any therapeutic jurisprudence analysis. Earlier we
noted the basic premise that jails and prisons do not exist primarily
to help their residents.45  They, therefore, lack the therapeutic
rhetoric more easily available to facilities for juveniles 4' and mental
hospitals. 47
Jails and prisons house a variety of people and serve a broad
range of functions (especially jails) ranging from pre-trial detention,
the confinement of probation and parole violators, persons serving
misdemeanor or felony sentences, persons awaiting transportation-
and more. Security, in our view, is the overriding concern of
custodians and while no one is placed in confinementfor the security
of the facility, security becomes the paramount concern of facility
operatives.
The politics surrounding jails and prisons are complex;
funding for nonsecurity staff is often seen, at best, as a necessary
I' Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (establishing Eighth Amendment right to
care). As one of us (JD) has argued elsewhere, to spend limited prison mental health
resources on institutional sex offender treatment is poor public policy for several
reasons. First, there is no evidence that prison based sex offender treatment programs
work to reduce recidivism. Second, due to the strong reward system for participation,
there is a high probability that performance will be less that sincere. Third, "successful"
completion of such programs may well result in earlier return to the community with no
decrease in risk. Fourth, with resources so limited, it makes more sense to treat
parolees who are already free, and thus have little incentive to participate except for an
honest desire to change or a fear of reoffending. Joel A. Dvoskin, Taking Issue:
Allocating Treatment Resources for Sex Offenders, 42 HOSPITAL & COMMUNITY
PSYCHIATRY 229, 229 (1991).
' See Mayer, supra note 28, at 253 (prisons required to screen inmates for substance
abuse problems). The authors view this as desirable but not mandated.
4S See supra text accompanying note 25.
•' See Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment, Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REv. 821, 895 (1988)
(stating juvenile correctional facilities are not as uniformly bad as adult prisons).
' Valerie J. Wilkinson, 1986 Amendments in Georgia's Mental Health Statutes: The
Latest Attempt to Provide a Solution to the Problem of the Chronically Mentally 111, 36
EMORY L.J. 1313, 1324 (1987).
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evil.48 No politician campaigns on a note of positive reform here;
voters are not romanced with pleas for a more therapeutic or humane
prison environment.49 Far more likely are appeals to "law and
order," claims that in order for our children to be safe, we must lock
up more and more people."0 There is little pretense today of any
interest in rehabilitation.51
Captives have a constitutional right to medical and mental
health care for their serious disorders 2 and they have a constitutional
right to an environment which does not threaten their lives.5 3 The
duty to provide :appropriate care and protection has common law
roots and modern constitutional application here.' The avoidance of
needless pain and suffering is the core constitutional value involved.55
These duties often converge and later in this article, when we attempt
to apply therapeutic jurisprudence analysis to custodial suicide issues,
we shall see that one's theory on the etiology of suicide will
determine which legal duty is arguably involved. 56
It is custodyper se, not its rationale, that creates these duties;
duties which are not mandated for those of us fortunate enough to
remain out of jail or prison. 7 If we are not in official custody we
have no right to medical or mental health care and no right to
s See Mayer, supra note 28, at 255-68 (discussing adequacy of mental health care
in prisons).
'9 See Harry Berkowitz, Five Days Campaign Countdown, NEwSDAY, Oct. 29, 1992,
at 19.
'o See, e.g., Prisons: The Case for Incarceration, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Jan. 21, 1993,
at A14 (quoting Attorney General William P. Barr that there is no better way to reduce
crime than to "identify, target, and incapacitate those hardened criminals... .").
sI See, e.g., Alvin E. Bessent, Cuomo's Anticrime Plan: Police, Prisons, New Laws,
NEwsDAY, May 9, 1989, at 5.
52 Mayer, supra note 28, at 244.
53 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102.
-1See DAVID RUDOVSKY ET AL., AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES UNION, THE RIGHTS
OF PRIsoNERS 1 (4th ed. 1988).
53 Fred Cohen & Joel Dvoskin, Inmates With Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and
Practice, 16 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 340 (1992).
See infra part V.
s DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (due
process limits a state's power to act but does not guarantee minimal levels of protection
for the general public).
CORRECTIONS: A GLIMPSE
physical security.5" While captives are owed these duties, their
impaired legal status, the overarching concern for security (which is
repeatedly validated by judicial deference to correctional decision
makers),59 and the daunting doctrinal and procedural rules imposed
upon captives make these governmental duties less than demanding.
The constitutional minima alluded to earlier is, indeed, a basement
floor.
The potential for subverting security or achieving some
measure of secondary gain are the practical, preliminary hurdles for
captives seeking mental health care. To receive treatment for an
illness, a captive must recognize symptoms, decide to seek relief, and
present to the authorities a claim of illness-strategies which vary
greatly by race, sex, class and setting. Captives are greatly impaired
in their ability to define for themselves the nature of their problem,
to select a care giver, or to select or reject a given course of
treatment.
In analyzing the professional judgment standard which has
evolved from Youngberg v. Romeo,"° Professor Susan Stefan writes:
It is difficult to imagine a relationship farther from
the voluntary, private professional-client model than
the relationship between a prisoner or pretrial detainee
and prison or jail officials.
. . . Not only has the Youngberg standard
been imported into challenges to the adequacy of
psychiatric care in prisons and jails, but it has also
been applied to cases challenging medical care without
a mental health component. Some courts have applied
Youngberg's professional judgment to wrongful death
actions arising from inmate suicides.6
Id. at 200.
See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1975) (stating that courts
are not equipped to deal with prison administration and reform).
457 U.S. 307 (1982).
6' Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts"': From Deference to Abdication
Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 704-05 (1992).
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The Court's adoption and expansive use of the professional
judgment standard, when linked to judicial deference applied to all
manner of decisions involving facility and population management,
and the increasingly onerous mental state requirements imposed on
the constitutional claims of captives,62 underscores the minimal
autonomy and liberty remaining with penal captives. Thus,
therapeutic jurisprudence concerns in the correctional setting are not
so easily dichotomized into liberty and autonomy versus therapeutic
results. Indeed, for captives the issue is more likely to be strategies
to minimally expand, as opposed to preserve, liberty and autonomy. 63
If a jailor intentionally fails to provide an inmate with food or
water and the inmate dies as a result, who would dispute this as
murder? If somewhere along in the starvation or dehydration process
the inmate demonstrated symptoms of serious mental illness and
received no mental health care, would we accuse the jailor only of a
failure to provide the basics necessary to sustain life? Is there an
independent cause of action for a failure to provide mandated mental
health care? Would it matter?
In a section 1983 law suit," both potential claims would be
grounded in the Eighth Amendment and both would require a
showing of deliberate indifference to the respective rights involved.65
These observations and questions serve as a segue to our final
section. This section will intertwine these matters with our encounter
with custodial suicide.
IV. Custodial Suicide: An Exercise in Therapeutic
Jurisprudence
We concede what the reader will recognize; it is something
of a stretch from our initial grappling with the meaning of therapeutic
62 Id. at 690-91 (explaining that the Youngberg standard commands courts to presume
the validity of professional judgments).
' See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982) (respondent arguing for
extension of his liberty interest to include safety, freedom of movement, and training).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) (establishing civil liability for deprivation of
constitutional rights under color of law).
'5 See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
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jurisprudence and its implications to looking at corrections through
the eyes of therapeutic jurisprudence to present topic: custodial
suicide. This no-frills section represents our effort to more
specifically apply therapeutic jurisprudence analysis to a concrete,
emotionally charged subject within corrections.
We are amateurs at this and, in effect, are displaying our
early notes albeit with a bit of polish. Thus, we approach therapeutic
jurisprudence and custodial suicide without a clear blueprint and some
uncertainty. We did learn that the manipulation of legal doctrine
needs to be joined with our earlier "on the ground" approach and we
do give that a run."
When a captive takes his or her own life-and this happens
about 400 times a year in jails and at least 100 times a year in
prisons"7-what are the legal issues involved surrounding liability?
And where might a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective be of some
value? Clearly, no rational person will view such a suicide as
therapeutic, particularly since so many are accomplished while the
victim is under the influence of some drug and experiencing the
initial terror of confinement.
In a recent article, Cohen summarized the applicable federal
case law as follows:
1. Custodians-whether they be police at a lockup,
sheriffs at a jail or correctional officials at a
prison-are not insurers of the life and safety of those
in their charge. While there clearly are constitutional
duties to preserve life and to provide medical or
mental health care, these duties will not translate into
some guarantee of safety, health, or the continuity of
life.
2. The standard for liability in the federal courts is
deliberate (sometimes referred to as reckless)
See supra text accompanying notes 20-24.
67 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE, supra note 38, at 669 (134 suicides in state and federal
correctional facilities in 1990). However, the National Center on Institutions and
Alternatives (NCIA) conducted a survey which determined the number of jail suicides
in 1985 and 1986 to be 453 and 401 respectively. Lindsay M. Hayes, National Study
of Jail Suicides: Seven Years Later, 60 PsYcHIATRc Q. 7, 15 (1989).
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indifference which, at a minimum, means culpability
beyond mere negligence. The defendants must be
shown either to have had knowledge of a particular
vulnerability to suicide or be required to have known;
this knowledge must create a strong likelihood, as
opposed to the possibility, of suicide; and this "strong
likelihood" must be so obvious that a lay person
would easily recognize the need for some preventive
action. Parenthetically, the courts seem to be
unaware of the fact that they are borrowing the
"obvious to a layman" phrase from prison and jail
mental health cases which state that a mental illness or
medical need is serious if it would be obvious to a lay
person that treatment was needed.
A custodial suicide per se is not conclusive proof of
deliberate indifference. If it were then custodians
would in fact be required to provide suicide-proof
institutions.
3. The general right of detainees to receive basic
medical or mental health care does not place upon jail
officials the responsibility to screen every detainee for
suicidal tendencies. A high percentage of detainees
arrive at a lockup or jail under the influence of
alcohol or some other drug and judicial decisions now
hold that being "under the influence" alone does not
enhance the custodian's duty to screen or to take
extraordinary suicide preventive measures.68
The issue of special relevance to therapeutic jurisprudence we
wish to explore relates to the requirement that one "knew or should
have known" of the risk and the suggestion that where there is no
legally imposed duty to develop suicide-relevant information, the
federal courts place a premium on ignorance. This plainly
discourages the wider adoption and use of reasonably easy to use and
accurate suicide screening and assessment instruments and even
I Fred Cohen, Liability for Custodial Suicide: The Information Base Requirements,
JAIL SUICIDE UPDATE, Summer 1992 at 1, 2 (footnotes omitted).
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encourages the manipulation of records to avoid use of the term
"suicide risk."
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep' of Health,69 the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the right of a competent, unconfined
person to refuse forced administration of life saving interventions.70
The Court accepted the power of the state to impose procedural
hurdles in safeguarding decisions by incompetents as to the continuity
of life.71 When a person is in custody, these issues are quite
different. The custodian has an unequivocal duty to preserve life
which clearly extends to preventing suicides. 72  Thus, while the
general, preventive duty is clear, it is the scope and implementation
of the duty which raise problems.
Absent a present, credible threat to commit suicide or actual
knowledge that the individual has in fact attempted suicide, the
federal courts are extremely reluctant to impose liability. In Edwards
v. Gilbert,73 the court stated flatly, "[iun the absence of a previous
threat or an earlier attempt at suicide, we know of no federal court
in the nation or any other court within this circuit that has concluded
that official conduct in failing to prevent a suicide constitutes
deliberate indifference. 7 4
For our purposes we may put aside the many questions related
to the appropriate measures to be taken when there is reason to take
seriously a suicide threat; measures ranging from close to intensive
observation, special cell placement, removal of items of clothing
which may be used to cause death, avoidance of single-ceiling, and
the like. The anterior question is when should (or must) those
precautions be taken? We certainly would not argue that such
precautions are necessary for every detainee or for every inmate. If
all captives were ordered to be placed under close, illuminated
69 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
70 id. at 278.
71 Id. at 280-81.
72 See Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992) (permitting the force
feeding of inmate when life or health is in danger). But see Thor v. Superior Court, 855
P.2d 375 (Cal. 1993) (denying a doctor's petition to surgically implant feeding and
medication tubes into a mentally competent quadriplegic prisoner who refused life-
sustaining treatment).
73 867 F.2d 1271 (11th Cir. 1989).
' Id. at 1275 (footnote omitted).
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observation, twenty-four hours a day, and if those orders were
effectively carried out, then presumably custodial suicides could be
eliminated. This blunderbuss approach would sacrifice the already
minimal claims to freedom and privacy enjoyed by captives, and
doubtlessly would create a needless array of severe management and
personnel allocation problems. Thus, a plainly desirable-even
therapeutic-outcome is outweighed by the considerable loss
associated with the means required.
The issue, then, lies somewhere between all and none;
between taking all captives' privacy and dignity and attempting to
locate and reasonably protect the "at risk" population.
The goal of preserving the life of captives seems to be so
clearly a dominant value as to need no debate.75 To reiterate, the
general duty of custodians to preserve life is clear; the trick is to
determine the trigger for, and the dimensions of, that duty.76 More
particularly, should it include a duty to develop suicide relevant
information, a duty to share such information, and a further training-
type duty to know how to interpret certain behavior or signs as
creating a suicide threat? We would answer yes to all three questions
and assert further that use of therapeutic jurisprudence analysis
dictates that answers.
Therapeutic jurisprudence analysis, with its emphasis on
outcomes, cannot entirely eschew doctrinal analysis. In the case of
custodial suicide, where the fatal act is carried out by the victim, one
must think through the basic components of culpable omissions.
Thus, before we take on each of these questions, we will display our
doctrinal note pad on omissions.
With the legal duty defined here as preventive, liability
analysis always will involve the question of a culpable omission.
Since a section 1983 claim 77--either to treatment or safety-requires
'5 See, e.g., Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, 947 F.2d 1042, 1067-68 (3d Cir.
1991) (holding that a municipality has a constitutional duty to provide persons in custody
some quantum of care and protection).
76 E.g., McLauglin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 125 (N.H. 1983). See Fred Cohen
& Joel Dvoskin, Inmates With Mental Disorders: A Guide to Law and Practice, 16
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 345 n.12 (1992).
'7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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that the defendant act, or fail to act, with deliberate indifference,78 we
must somehow fit these omissions into the domain of deliberate
indifference.
An omission is defined by a specific act or acts which if done
would have satisfied the actor's obligation.79 Failure to obtain
relevant information will not by itself impose liability, except perhaps
as a violation of local law requiring this activity. 80
Our concern is not with employer-employee consequences.
Rather, it is with the failure to seek information which, if obtained,
would likely have alerted the custodian and would be causally related
to a preventable suicide. If legal causation is an important policy
question, as an assignment of blame, then given the custodian's
relationship in time and space to the captive, given the general duty
of care and de facto dependance by the captive on the custodian,
doctrinal manipulation on the causation issue is relatively easy.81
We expand duty to encompass enlarged notions of liability.
Enlarged notions of liability may create inducements to prevent the
tragedy of custodial suicide.
We have not read about a fellow captive being sued or
criminally charged with failure to prevent a suicide or to interrupt one
in process. The issue here is not only the likelihood of a captive
being judgment proof; it is probably because we never thought about
it and, more importantly, because suicide prevention is the legal
obligation of the custodian and only the moral obligation of the fellow
captive.
78 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 ("[P]risoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently
harmful to evidence deliberate indifference."); Simmons, 947 F.2d at 1064 (requiring a
§ 1983 claimant to show "policymakers" deliberately chose or acquiesced to long
standing policy of inaction).
79 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3)(b) (1985) (stating the liability for the
commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action
unless a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law).
8 E.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.10 (McKinney 1987).
" Cf Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d 1224, 1226 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that a
series of incidents that are closely related in time may disclose a pattern of conduct
amounting to deliberate indifference by prison officials). See generally Charles M. Holt,
Sheriffs Liability for Prisoner Suicide: Hemly v. Bebber, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1520 (1986)
(analyzing the criteria reviewed when determining custodial liability for prisoner
suicides).
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It is not difficult to establish that it is negligence for a jailor
to fail to check a jail's easily obtainable master files for evidence of
prior suicide attempts, for an earlier shift with knowledge of suicide
threats to overlook sharing this information with the incoming shift,
or for an arresting officer to fail to inform the booking officers of his
knowledge of the arrestee's suicide attempts. However, to establish
section 1983 liability, the trick is to characterize such omissions as
deliberate indifference.82
Deliberate indifference is the constitutionally mandated mental
element for liability in prisoner health care litigation as well as a
"duty to protect." Estelle v. Gamble established this culpability
requirement, although a search of all Supreme Court decisions reveals
no prior reference to deliberate indifference or to any close variation
of the phrase.8" Given the novelty of the phrase one might have
expected some effort at definition. Instead, the Estelle decision
labored only to explain what deliberate indifference was not.
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical
care cannot be said to constitute "an unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain" or to be "repugnant to the
conscience of mankind." Thus, a complaint that a
physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating
a medical condition does not state a valid claim of
medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.
Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner."
The avoidance of needless pain or death is at the core of
deliberate indifference and the necessary bridge to the harm
requirement.
One of the most intriguing discussions of deliberate
indifference, which culminates in the most defense-oriented
definitions, is by Judge Richard Posner in Duckworth v. Franzen.85
I See generally City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (discussing level of
inadequate training needed to establish municipal liability for failure to train police).
8 Search of Westlaw S.Ct. and S.Ct. Old databases (Nov. 11, 1993).
84 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. at 105-06.
s 780 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1985).
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After marking off negligence, recklessness, and deliberateness as the
three traditional mental elements to be consulted in order to determine
deliberate indifference, Judge Posner states:
If the word "punishment" in cases of prisoner
mistreatment is to retain a link with normal usage, the
infliction of suffering on prisoners can be found to
violate the Eighth Amendment only if that infliction is
either deliberate, or reckless in the criminal law
sense. Gross negligence is not enough. Unlike
criminal recklessness it does not import danger so
great that knowledge of the danger can be inferred;
and we remind that the "indifference" to the
prisoner's welfare must be "deliberate" implying such
knowledge.86
More recent decisions from the Seventh Circuit support the
Duckworth formulation and, indeed, actually may increase the burden
for plaintiffs. For example, in Salazar v. City of Chicago8" the court
reiterated the "reckless in a criminal sense" formulation emphasizing
the need for "'complete indifference to risk-when the actor does not
care whether the other person lives or dies, despite knowing there is
a significant risk of death.'"88
In Langley v. Coughlin,89 a prison mental health case, the
federal magistrate took a bit more expansive view of deliberate
indifference, stating:
[A]n isolated and inadvertent error in treating even a
serious medical need would not constitute a violation
since the Eighth Amendment does not constitutionalize
the law of medical malpractice. On the other hand,
a serious failure to provide needed medical attention
when the defendants are fully aware of that need
Id. at 652-53 (citations omitted).
'7940 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1991).
"Id. at 238 (quoting Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1219 (7th Cir.
1988)).
" 715 F. Supp. 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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could well constitute deliberate indifference, even if
they did not act with a punitive intent.
[W]hile one isolated failure to treat,
without more, is ordinarily not actionable, it may in
fact rise to the level of a constitutional violation if the
surrounding circumstances suggest a degree of
deliberateness, rather than inadvertence, in the failure
to render meaningful treatment. Moreover, the
inference of such indifference may be based upon
proof of a series of individual failures by the prison
to provide adequate medical care even if each such
failure-viewed in isolation-might amount only to
simple negligence."
"Two key points may be discerned from the above excerpt. First,
deliberate indifference may be shown by a series of negligent acts or
omissions which then may cumulate to become a constitutional
violation. No single act or omission need attain deliberate
indifference .... ,91
Where a jail has experienced a number of suicides (as in the
Upper Darby, PA cases' and the recently reported forty-seven
Mississippi jail suicides93) then clearly there is notice that a problem
exists. Whether that problem is a failure to screen, failure to take
minimal precautions, or even design failure is not clear.
This, of course, is not the same type of notice as that
provided by a captive's shouts of wanting to die. But it is plain
enough to construct at least the duty to screen for suicide risk. When
the general screening produces a history of mental hospitalization or
prior suicide attempts, a custodian should have the duty to go further,
discover more facts through a detailed history, and perhaps institute
I ld. at 536 (citations and footnotes omitted).
9' Cohen & Dvoskin, supra note 76, at 343.
Colbum v. Upper Darby, 838 F.2d 663, 672 (3d Cir. 1988) (reversing dismissal
of complaint because allegation that local officials inadequately monitored jails stated
sufficient cause of action where three suicides occurred in police custody in three years),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989).
" Michael Isikoff, Reno Orders Probe of Hangings in Mississippi Jails, WASH.
POST, Apr. 15, 1993, at A3.
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precautions. Beyond the individual scream and a history of
successful custodial suicides, there is data that allows construction of
an "at risk" profile.
The best data on jail suicides comes from the Nation Center
on Institutions and Alternatives (NCIA) located in Alexandria, VA.
NCIA's 1986 study replicated a study it conducted seven years
earlier' and the key indicators were virtually the same: fifty percent
of jail suicides are completed within the first twenty-four hours of
confinement; twenty-seven percent in the first three hours. 95
Two of every three victims were in isolation and ninety-four
percent died by hanging.96 Ninety percent were detainees and sixty
percent were intoxicated when confined.' In police holding facilities,
sixty-four percent died within three hours of confinement.9" In jails,
eighty-nine percent of the victims were not screened for suicidal
behavior, while in lock-ups, ninety-seven percent were not.99 The
average age of a suicide victim is thirty and the detention is almost
always for a non-violent crime. °°
The data scream at us: the relatively young, intoxicated or
drugged, isolated, white, non-violent inmate in the initial hours of
confinement commits suicide by hanging. He hasn't been screened
and, obviously, has not been watched closely enough.
A more recent, albeit small scale, study argues that there may
indeed be more than one suicide profile.
Thus, in all likelihood, there is not one profile
but rather a variety of suicide profiles. One is
probably composed of first-time arrestees who are
9 See Hayes, supra note 67, at 7.
9 Id. at 20.
9' Id. at 20, 19.
'7 Id. at 12, 19.
6 Id. at 20.
9 See Hayes, supra note 67, at 21.
'o Id. at 18. Space does not permit a more complete summary of NCIA's data.
However, there are some interesting anomalies: black inmates account for 41% of jail
population, but only 16% of all suicides. Id. at 13, 18. Most victims are single and the
hours between midnight and 3 a.m. are the most dangerous. Id. at 18, 19.
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intoxicated at the time of arrest, who are
overwhelmed by the stress of the jail environment,
and who attempt shortly after incarceration.
Recently, several studies have been published which
indicate a much higher prevalence of panic disorders
and attacks in the general population, as well as
indicate a link between panic attacks and suicide
attempts. Given the stress of the jail environment,
this may have specific application to this particular
subgroup, whose existence is well documented in the
two NCIA studies.
An additional profile encompasses the inmate
who is vulnerable to any changes in his support
system and who attempts suicide. Another is the
inmate arrested for more serious charges and who
attempts after several months, usually in relation to a
court date. Undoubtedly others will also be
identified. While other studies have postulated or
identified these groups, the present study has
accumulated further evidence to support their
existence and added insight into an important
variable-the presence of significant mental disorders
and a chronic history of both suicide attempts and
mental illness which make these two groups more
vulnerable and at risk.101
This data does suggest that the risk-and the profile-changes
somewhat as time in confinement is extended. For the earliest stages
of confinement the remedy is plain and inexpensive: intake screening
and suicide prevention training of officers.
Every set of standards and accreditation procedures of which
we are aware calls for policy and procedure mandating screening and
subsequent evaluation when indicated."0 2 Some thirty-six states have
adopted jail standards but "most states lack even the basic criteria for
101 Larry D. LeBrun, Characteristics of Male Suicide Attempts in the Sacramento
County Jail, 1985-87, JAIL SUICIDE UPDATE, Fall 1989 at 1, 3.
102 See,.e.g., National Standards of Jail Suicide Prevention, JAIL SUICIDE UPDATE,
Summer 1989 at 1, 1 (discussing the need for standard of suicide prevention in jails).
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suicide prevention."" °3 Only eight states' jail standards specify
suicidal behavior inquiry on their intake screening.1'°
The presence or absence of standards does not correlate with
constitutional mandates. With the results so tragic, with the number
of deaths sufficiently high and with prevention so easy and
inexpensive, the case for deliberate indifference when there is no
screening/evaluation seems clear. However, when the federal courts
require actual knowledge of risk there is a powerful disincentive to
acquire relevant, preventive information.
Most civil suicide cases are settled but, of course, that still
expends public money and personal tragedy remains, including the
trauma often experienced by staff."0 5 Despite the stereotype of
correctional officers as unfeeling or cynical, it has been our consistent
experience that "successful" suicides in correctional settings have a
devastating emotional effect on the staff involved. 1" In part, this
may be due to the incident review, investigation, and possible
sanctions for failing to perform their duty to keep each inmate alive.
But to an equal or greater extent, one hears about feelings of guilt
("he died on my watch; I was supposed to be there"), loss, sadness,
and even anger that sound eerily similar to what surviving family
members express in similar situations.
V. Conclusion
Finally, one's diagnosis on the cause of suicide will dictate
the nature of the legal obligation. However, in the earliest stages of
custodial obligation-certainly the first forty-eight hours-the initial
obligation is preventive and if the initial crisis passes and the episode
seems situational and not linked with mental illness, that may be the
'0 State Standards and Suicide Prevention: A Report Card, JAIL SUICIDE UPDATE,
Summer 1989 at 4, 4.
104 Id.
6 Cf. Lewis L. Laska, Medical Malpractice Cases Not to File, 20 MEM. ST. U. L.
REV. 27, 59 (1989) (verdict in suicide/medical malpractice case is rare).
t1 See Paul J. Heald, Retroactivity, Capital Sentencing, and the Jurisdictional
Contours of Habeas Corpus, 42 ALA. L. REV. 1273, 1331 (1991) (discussing the stress
of being a correctional officer as a mitigating factor in death penalty cases).
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end of the obligation. If the diagnosis is that the suicidal captive is
seriously mentally ill then, along with a preventive obligation, there
is a treatment obligation. The longer the confinement the more likely
the preventive obligation will merge into the treatment obligation.
We have walked the halls of many prisons and jails and one
of us bears heavy oversight responsibility for captives whose suicide
potential is a constant concern. Thus, this exercise is, in fact, one
that flows from the library as well as the real world walk we earlier
recommended.
Custodial suicide initially seemed like a good candidate for a
therapeutic jurisprudence exercise because we were bedeviled by the
federal courts' narrow and seemingly insensitive approach to the
deliberate indifference standards for section 1983 liability. The "know
or should have known" part of the equation has been resolved
essentially in favor of an actual knowledge requirement whereas a
more generous view of "should have known" would have expanded
liability potential but also likely stimulated ameliorative measures.
Plainly, if the reduction of custodial suicides is a therapeutic
end to pursue, to the extent that the federal courts are seen as the
focus for this objective-and, of course, that is open to reasonable
debate-then "should have known" must be pried open and new
content poured in. This new content must discourage willful or
reckless ignorance and encourage reasonable efforts to identify and
then react to the at-risk captive population.
